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L INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 (FSIA) was 
initially hailed as a "wedge"2 by which American plaintiffs, in-
cluding the U.S. government, could challenge anticompetitive 
actions of foreign conspirators.3 To date, the FSIA has not fulfilled 
this promise, and seems unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. 
On its face, the FSIA appears to cut away jurisdictional and 
even substantive barriers to the international reach of the anti-
• B.A. University of Colorado, 1968; J.D. Georgetown University, 1971. Currently a 
partner in the law firm of deKieffer, Berg & Creskoff in Washington, D.C. 
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891 (1976), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611. 
2. Comment by Alexander Sierck, Director of Trade Policy, Antitrust Division, 
United States Department of Justice, at the Fifth Annual Fordham Corporate Law In-
stitute in New York City (1979). 
3. The purpose of the FSIA is to meet the needs which have arisen from the increas-
ing participation of foreign state enterprises in every day commercial activities. H.R. REP. 
No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6605. It 
would serve this purpose by the accomplishment of four objectives. (1) It would codify the 
so-called "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, by which the immunity of a foreign 
state is restricted to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperiil and does not 
extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestioni.) (2) It would help to en-
sure that this restrictive theory of immunity is applied in litigation before U.S. courts. "At 
present, this is not always the case." [1976] USCCAN at 6605-06. The State Department is 
often enlisted by the foreign governmental defendant to urge its claim of immunity before 
the U.S. court. 
A principle purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign im-
munity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the 
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that 
these often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds; ... [t]he Depart-
ment of State would be freed from "foreign political pressures" ... . 
Id. at 6606. (3) It would provide a statutory procedure for service of process and personal 
jurisdiction. (4) It would provide American judgment creditors with some means of enforce-
ment which had not previously existed in U.S. courts. Id. 
Although the House Report accompanying the FSIA did not state that it had as one 
of its specific objectives the restriction of sovereign immunity in antitrust cases , the cases 
decided and which are cited in the discussion infra have so applied the FSIA. See id. at 
6616-6621 (explaining the general exceptions to foreign state jurisdictional immunity listed 
in § 1605 of the FSIA). 
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trust laws. The FSIA 4 codified what had developed in practice 
over the years as a distinction between government or public acts 
of sovereignty and purely commercial acts in which the "sovereign 
had descended to the level of an entrepreneur ."5 
Thus, the FSIA apparently would permit extension of our 
antitrust laws to: 
(1) Reach acts committed by foreign government-owned com-
panies, or even foreign private companies acting at the behest of 
their governments which, had they occurred in the United 
States, would have been illegal; 
(2) Prohibit the "fruits" of such illegal acts committed abroad 
from entering the United States; and 
(3) Reach even conspiracies which involve no U.S. citizens and 
commercial enterprises located entirely outside the U.S. 
It is evident, however, that American antitrust plaintiffs 
4. Key sections include: 
(A) Section 1603. Definitions. For purpose of this chapter-
(a) A "foreign state" ... includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an 
agency or instrumentaility of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b). 
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof. ... 
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity 
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the court of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose (emphasis added). 
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" 
means commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact 
with the United States. 
(B) Section 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the 
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; 
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
effect in the United States; ... 
For general discussion of the FSIA, see Interference With Contracts and Business in 
New York, 18 HARV. INTL. L. J. 429 (1977). 
5. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 
(1977). 
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would not find sufficient support in the FSIA to overcome various 
substantive defenses, given the present state of United States law 
and policy and the cases brought thus far under it. 
Although the United States has been moving toward expand-
ing the extra-territorial jurisdiction of its antitrust laws in certain 
circumstances,6 it is unlikely that a court would be willing to reach 
even the most egregious foreign conspiracies for legal, practical 
and foreign policy considerations. 
Relevant U.S. laws include Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act,7 Section 4 of the Clayton Act,8 the Robinson-Patman Act,9 the 
Wilson Tariff Act, 10 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. 11 All these laws apply to restraints of trade affecting U.S. 
interstate and foreign commerce once personal jurisdiction is 
achieved. While effective antitrust relief from the government's 
point of view requires more than a remedy against the goods, 12 
this would not be a relevant concern for private plaintiffs.13 
IL DEFENSES TO AN ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST 
FOREIGN DEFENDANTS 
Even given the fact that a violation of U.S. antitrust law is 
not made exempt simply by reason of its foreign origin,14 and 
assuming direct and substantial effects upon U.S. commerce to 
satisfy the Sherman Act's jurisdictional requirements, 15 plaintiffs 
6. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the antitrust laws requires only that the 
foreign-based contract, combination or conspiracy have substantial and direct effects on the 
import or export trade of the United States. See note 15 infra and cases cited therein. 
7. 15 u.s.c. §§ l, 2 (1976). 
8. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1976). 
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21a (1976). 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976). This Act has rarely been used by' the government, because its 
sanctions are limited (violation of§ 8 is a misdemeanor and the fine is $5,000) and the exclu-
sion of goods pursuant to a successful prosecution reduces domestic supply and thus in-
creases prices to consumers. See w. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
498-543 (2d ed. 1973) (collecting cases under the Wilson Tariff Act). 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). 
12. See BAKER, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Short-
ages and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 911, 915 & n. 29 
(1976). 
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6, 15 (sections of Clayton Act giving private citizens right to sue 
against the goods involved or for treble damages, respectively). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-276 (1927); Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962). 
15. Continental_ Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See 
also United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. 
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still would have to overcome the defenses of act of state, 
sovereign immunity and foreign compulsion. The most significant 
problem is that anticompetitive behavior initiated abroad might 
have been suggested, directed, approved or ordered by a foreign 
sovereign. 
If government-directed behavior occurs in the foreign 
sovereign's territory (as distinguished from behavior occurring 
within U.S. territory which is clearly reachable by U.S. antitrust 
laws), there appears to be very little a public or private plaintiff 
can do about it.16 This is a classic case of "sovereign compulsion;" a 
corollary11 to the "act of state" doctrine dictating that U.S. law will 
not interfere, through judicial scrutiny, with a sovereign's acts in 
its own territory.18 Several cases support the theory that cor-
porate conduct "compelled" by a foreign sovereign is also pro-
tected from antitrust liability as though it were an act of the state 
itself .19 
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 440-45 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Watchmakers of 
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., (1963] TRADE CASES (CCH) , 70,600 (1962), modified 
(1965) TRADE CASES (CCH), 71,352, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES§ 18 (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT), L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 
714-717 (1977). Professor Sullivan notes that 
the Alcoa case is particulary important in showing the scope of the Act. In all 
other cases cited [above], one or more of the defendants was an American firm and 
some conduct involved in the violation took place in America. In Alcoa, however, 
the court held the Sherman Act forbade conduct engaged in by foreign firms out-
side of the territorial limits of America where the conduct was intended to and did 
affect American imports. 
Id. at 715, n.3. 
16. In other words, the clear, unequivocal and legal command of the sovereign is 
a defense to an antitrust violation, subject to some "territorial wrinkles." If a 
foreign government commands an American business to do something in that 
government's territory, the firm has no problem; it can participate in a market 
allocation scheme, or help the government keep other American producers out of 
the market. 
Baker, supra note 9, at 917 n.6. He notes that American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 
U.S. 347 (1909) is still viable precedent to support this principle. Id. 
17. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976). 
18. The leading modern statement of the doctrine appears in Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
19. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 
(D. Del. 1970) (refusal by defendants to sell Venezuelan crude oil to plaintiff not actionable 
restraint of trade because Venezuelan government imposed boycott on plaintiff); see United 
States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., (1963] TRADE CASES 
(CCH) 1 70,600 (1962), order modified, (1965] TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 71,352 (although not the 
case here, court noted if "the defendant's activities had been required by Swiss law, this 
court could indeed do nothing."). Mere approval or permission by the foreign sovereign does 
not constitute compulsion. See text notes 39-62, infra, and accompanying text. 
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Some debate has arisen recently regarding what constitutes 
both a "state" act and the proper framework for analyzing the 
sovereign compulsion defense. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank 
of America,20 while the court found a decree of a Honduran court 
not to constitute a sovereign act,21 section 40 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States22 did pro-
vide a framework to determine whether to interfere with such an 
act where the court had determined that a full-fledged act of state 
was involved and a conflict between the laws of two sovereigns 
had occurred.23 This balancing-of-interests or comity analysis has 
been greeted with approval by at least two commentators.24 
20. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
21. The court quoted language from RESTATEMENT§ 41's Comment d.-Nature of Act 
of State: 
An 'act of state' as the term is used in this Title involves the public interests of a 
state as a state, as distinct from its interest in providing the means of adjudicating 
disputes or claims that arise within its territory .... A judgment of a court may be an 
act of state. Usually it is not, because it involves the interests of private litigants or 
because court adjudication is not the usual way in which the state exercises its 
jurisdiction to give effect to public interests. 
22. Some of the factors to be considered, according to RESTATEMENT§ 40, are the vital 
national interests of each of the states, the extent of the hardship on a defendant caused by 
inconsistent enforcement, where the activity takes place, the nationality of the defendant, 
and the effectiveness of enforcement attempted by a distant government. See notes 64-64, 
infra, and accompanying text. 
23. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 & n. 31. 
24. See Remarks of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, "The Extra-Territorial Impact of U.S. Antitrust Laws: 
Causes and and Consequences" (Dep't. of Justice Release, Aug. 9, 1978) (remarks to ABA 
Section of International Law, 1978 ABA Annual Meeting); American Society of Interna-
tional Law Proceeding of the 72nd Annual Meeting 109, 118 (1978) (hereinafter cited as 
ASIL Proceedings) (remarks of Douglas E. Rosenthal, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, 
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice). 
Comity in practice may be observed in the statement of British jurist Lord Denning, 
Master of the Rolls, in a recent case. In response to a request from U.S. District Court 
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. for evidence to be used in a U.S. trial involving alleged an-
titrust violations, obtainable only from witnesses residing in England, Lord Denning 
characterized his actions accommodating Judge Merhige's request in terms of the gold rule: 
... Federal Judge Merhige ... makes it clear that the letters rogatory are con-
cerned with material that is required not merely for pre-trial procedure (as it is 
called in the United States of America) but for evidence and documents for actual 
use at the trial. ... It is our duty and our pleasure to do all we can to assist that 
court, just as we would expect the United States court to help us in like cir-
cumstances. "Do unto others as you would be done by." 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 232, [1977) 3 
W.L.R. 430, 434-36 (C.A.) quoted in Merhige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case: Problems 
Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L. LA w. 19, 22 (1979). 
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This framework, however, only approaches the underlying 
question. The critical step is to determine precisely what factors 
will tip the scales in favor of ' reaching an act of a foreign 
sovereign. Several cases are helpful. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 25 
the court refused to allow an antitrust suit to proceed against the 
seven major oil companies which alleged the companies' con-
spiratorial actions led to the expropriation of plaintiff's assets in 
Libya. Although the complainant was careful to avoid naming 
Libya as a defendant or to suggest that the sovereign was a co-
conspirator, the court agreed with defendants that the damage to 
plaintiffs was caused by the expropriation-an act of the 
sovereign-and not by the conspiracy. The court determined that 
it was barred by the act of state doctrine from examining the 
issues further. 26 
In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 27 the 
court accepted an act of state defense even though the plaintiff 
alleged the defendant had induced the sovereign to act,28 but in 
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 29 four Justices 
would have extended the commercial exception to sovereign im-
munity from jurisdiction to reach the "purely" commercial acts of 
governments and thus would have eliminated the act of state doc-
trine as a defense to those actions.30 
As noted by Professor Eleanor Fox of the New York Univer-
sity School of Law ,31 the act of state is an infrequent component of 
antitrust suits. The acts of private parties compelled by states ap-
pear in these suits more often, but few cases have adjudicated 
directly the sovereign compulsion defense. Two of these cases 
25. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). 
26. 550 F.2d at 72-73. 
27. 331 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Cal. 1971), aff'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 950 (1971) (following classical definition of act of state doctrine stated in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). 
28. 331 F. Supp. 92, 110. 
29. 425 u .s. 682 (1976). 
30. Id. at 695. Because a majority did not join in this portion of the opinion, it is an 
open question whether the present Court would consider taking the commercial exception 
this far, given the current Court's conservative new "antitrust majority" which has been 
limiting antitrust remedies by insisting upon tougher factual standards of proof. See Baker, 
supra note 9, at 914 & n. 15 (citing U.S. v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974) (White, 
J. dissenting; referring to Justice Stewart and the four Nixon appointees-Burger, C.J., 
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.-as the new "antitrust majority.")) 
31. See ASIL Proceedings, supra note 24, at 98. 
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stand as valid precedent for the defense. In Interamerican Refin-
ing Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 32 regulatory authorities in 
Venezuela ordered a boycott against plaintiff denying it supplies 
of crude oil. One reason apparently was the presence in plaintiff's 
company of a person disliked by the Venezuelan government. The 
court reasoned by analogy from Parker v. Brown,33 which held 
that compliance with a state regulatory program does not subject 
one to antitrust liability, and found genuine sovereign compulsion 
a complete defense.34 The court also relied upon United States v. 
The Watchmakers of Switer'land Information Center, Inc., 35 for 
this proposition. The Justice Department's suggestions to the con-
trary notwithstanding, there seems to be no reason to doubt that 
courts will follow these cases in similar circumstances. 
The one avenue of hope in that direction-the FSIA- has 
yielded little consolation. It is important to note the FSIA is only 
jurisdictional and does not affect directly the substantive defenses 
of sovereign compulsion and act of state.36 Commentators have 
discussed the concept of extending the commercial test to the act 
of state/sovereign compulsion defense. For example, if a state can-
not hide behind its sovereignty when doing commerical activities 
to avoid a court's jurisdiction, the issue is whether the state 
should by indirection be able to foil the court's power by setting 
up that same sovereignty as a substantive defense to the action. 
At least one commentator supports the unlikelihood of its 
success.37 
32. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). 
33. 317 u .s. 341 (1943). 
34. 307 F. Supp. at 1297, 1298. It should be noted that the Justice Department in its 
Antitrust Guide For International Operations, reprinted in [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) (No. 799) at E-14 ("Case K") argues that Maracaibo was wrongly decided. When 
questioned about this at the ASIL meeting, however, Mr. Rosenthal (Chief, Foreign Com-
merce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice) attempted to explain the 
meaning of Case K by stating that a distinction possibly could be drawn between the 
private and governmental acts; but that further clarification is needed. ASIL Proceedings, 
supra note 24, at 112. 
35. (1963) TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 70,600 (1962), modified, (1965) TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 
71,352. 
36. See Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, Sept. 1977 ANTITRUST 
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA). Moreover, the difficulty in establishing any firm guidelines as to 
what belongs in the "purely commercial" category appears to be enormous, for political 
rather than simply logical or conceptual reasons. See remarks of Mark R. Joelson, ASIL 
Proceedings, supra note 24, at 100-01. 
37. Compare Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns, 77 
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Cases which were based upon or involved the FSIA have in-
dicated that the FSIA will not prove to be a useful tool for under-
cutting the compulsion defense or limiting the act of state doc-
trine, and the circumstances in which the FSIA is employed will 
involve relatively noncontroversial contract or tort settings.38 
COLUM. L. REV. 1247, 1254-55 (1977) and Schwartz, The Anti-Foreign Compulsion Act: Pro-
posed Legislation, 12 INT'L LAW. 649, 651-2 (1978) (both arguing that Congress did not intend 
to remove the sovereign compulsion defense by enacting the FSIA because of the difficulty 
in creating a true "commercial-political" distinction in antitrust matters) with Note, Interna-
tional Law-Act of State Doctrine-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Alfred 
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 318, 340-48 (1977) 
(possibility exists of convincing the Supreme Court to extend Dunhill and the logic of the 
FSIA to limit the act of state and related defenses) and 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 487 (1978) (if 
"purely commercial" context could be established, the Timberlane comity analysis, § 40 of 
the RESTATEMENT and the FSIA taken together might overcome the act of state defense). 
The Note in 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247 is persuasive: 
Although one might argue that an anticompetitive economic conspiracy is 
"commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA, it seems unlikely that the courts 
would ever allow such a suit to be brought against a foreign sovereign defendant. 
No case has, as yet, gone that far. From the cases denying the sovereign immunity 
defense to foreign governments, it would appear that the purpose served by the 
restrictive theory is to open the courts in situations where the law is relatively 
non-controversial, and where, in effect, an arbiter is needed to determine the facts 
and grant an appropriate remedy. Most of the cases have involved ordinary tort 
and contract claims arising from the sale and delivery of goods. The legal precepts 
involved have been those of virtually universal acceptance. To enforce rights 
grounded in non-controversial laws against sovereign defendants does not involve 
the imposition of alien ideological doctrine, with concomitant risks to the smooth 
conduct of foreign relations. 
By constrast, to assert that sovereign activity violating peculiarly American 
standards of proper business conduct is "commercial" within the meaning of the 
FSIA would be to impose economic assumptions which are by no means universal-
ly shared by foreign governments. One need only imagine the potential for embar-
rassment of a class action on behalf of all United States petroleum consumers 
against the OPEC nations alleging that the 1973 oil embargo constituted a group 
boycott in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Given the basic purpose of 
sovereign immunity, as stated both in recent judicial decisions and under the 
FSIA-prevention of judicial interference with international relations- and given 
the grave risk of interference posed by antitrust actions, it would seem that Con-
gress did not intend the FSIA to permit such suits against foreign governments. 
(Citations omitted). 
77 CoLUM. L. REV. at 1254-55. 
38. See, e.g., National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 
622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (contract; denying immunity to state trading company for liability once-
ment contract); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novostni Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(tort; a state entity may do acts which at times subject it to jurisdiction, but here TASS 
held immune in libel action); Edlow Intern. Co. v. Nuklearna Electrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 
827 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (action to recover broker's fees; Yugoslavian nuclear power plant's 
"worker's organization" not an agency of the state for FSIA purposes in action by Bermuda 
corporation to recover broker's fees on uranium sale contract); compare Carey v. National 
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IIL BEHAVIOR APPROVED OR SUGGESTED BY FOREIGN 
GOVERNMENT 
A more difficult question is presented, and different results 
may be reached, when the behavior complained of has not been 
compelled by a foreign sovereign, but rather is associated with the 
mere approval of or a suggestion by the sovereign to the private 
party .39 In addition, the degree of ownership or control of foreign 
corporations by foreign governments may be important for two 
reasons. First, a foreign corporation wholly or partly owned by a 
foreign sovereign may constitute a "foreign state or instrumentali-
ty" for jurisdictional purposes.40 On the other hand, sovereign 
ownership or control may constitute indicia of the political nature 
of the foreign entity's activities. 
The historical development of these concepts can be traced to 
1927. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. 41 a conspiracy was 
formed in the United States for the purpose of monopolizing sales 
to the United States of a raw material used in the making of rope. 
In aid of this conspiracy the private party enlisted the assistance 
of the Mexican government to impose discriminatory taxes on 
rival sellers and to recognize the conspirators as exclusive 
traders. The Supreme Court ruled that mere governmental ap-
proval of a conspiracy for the purpose of monopolizing sales to the 
United States was not protected simply because of a foreign 
sovereign's limited involvement.42 
Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporation created and wholly owned by Libya 
immune for acts arising out of nationalization which resulted in contract termination); Gitler 
v. German Information Center, 95 Misc. 2d 788, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (action to 
recover compensation for services rendered in employment; agency immune because work 
meant to foster cultural relations was "diplomatic" activity). See also Brower, Bristline and 
Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AMER. J. !NT'L L. 
200 (1979) (collecting cases, at 213-14) [hereinafter cited as Brower, Bristline and Loomis]. 
39. It has been argued that even this distinction- "compulsion" is different from the 
mere "suggestion" of a foreign sovereign -is essentially meaningless: 
[I have] often heard it said by foreign lawyers that the American case law and the 
Justice Department's insistence on compulsion, as opposed to encouragement or 
approval, is really a naive distinction and that in fact if a foreign sovereign sug-
gests that it might be a nice thing for you to raise prices in honor of his birthday, 
then that in effect means 'we hereby direct you.' 
ASIL PROCEEDINGS at 117 (comment of unidentified speaker). 
40. See definitional sections of FSIA § 1603(a) & (b), supra note 4. 
41. 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
42. Id. at 594. Sisal was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 & n. 13 (1962). 
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A district court in New York in 1929 significantly extended 
the concept in denying immunity to defendants in United States v. 
Deutsches Kalisyndicat Gesellschaft. 43 Although the Ambassador 
of France was not a defendant in the case, he filed a motion to 
dismiss on behalf of certain incorporated defendants. In this suit 
brought by the United States to enjoin violations of our antitrust 
laws, the French Ambassador wrote to the Secretary of State to 
inform him that one of the defendant corporations was an 
organization which was controlled by the Republic of France in 
the administration of certain mines. The letter also stated the pro-
ceeds of these mines went into the revenue of France and were 
applied to governmental purposes. The corporate defendant was 
organized by the French government to act as its sales agent and 
eleven-fifteenth's of its capital stock was owned by the govern-
ment. Its governing board, on which sat a delegate from each of 
several French ministries of government, controlled the corpora-
tion for the benefit of the French government. The French Am-
bassador stated that he considered the action in effect a suit 
against the Republic of France.44 Apparently relying heavily upon 
the fact that the State Department did not make any suggestion to 
the court that it should dismiss the suit, the French Ambassador's 
letter notwithstanding, the court held the commercial activities of 
the defendant corporations were subject to suit in U.S. courts.45 
This case seemingly goes further than most courts would be 
willing to go under similar circumstances today. Although legally 
well reasoned, one cannot help but conclude that the silence of the 
State Department in this matter was the persuasive factor for the 
court.46 It should be noted this case was cited with approval as late 
43. 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N .Y. 1929) [hereinafter cited as Deutsches.] 
44. Id. at 200. 
45. Id. at 202-03. 
46. Although enactment of the FSIA in 1976 was intended to make jurisdictional deci-
sions of a matter of a court's discretion rather than that of the Department of State, 
some question remains as to the degree to which the influence of the Department 
of State has, in fact, been exercised. Despite protestations that it would in the 
future restrict itself to amicus curiae briefs, the Department responded to a re-
quest for diplomatic assistance in conjunction with the Novosti Press Agency case 
[Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (1978)) by stating that 
it "concurs in the position taken by the attorneys for Novosti" regarding the 
retroactivity of the Act's application; and the court referred to and substantially 
accepted this statement. The Department, however, did decline to render an opi-
nion on the merits of the claim to immunity. It remains to be seen whether sue-
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as 1949 in McGrath v. Manufacturers Trust Co.47 
A more recent case discussing the nature of a "corporate 
agent" of a foreign sovereign was In Re Investigation of World 
Arrangement.48 This case involved several corporate defendants 
in a massive antitrust suit alleging a world cartel of petroleum 
markets. One of the defendants, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was 
held to be "indistinguishable from the Government of Great Bri-
tain."49 The situation was remarkably similar to Deutsches which 
the court cited. In World Arrangements, a letter was also written 
by a high diplomatic official stating that the corporate defendant's 
refusal to tender documents to the U.S. court was done under in-
structions of the sovereign acting "in the _British public interest, 
including the economic, strategic and political interest" of the 
foreign sovereign.50 This letter, sent by the British Foreign 
Secretary to the State Department, was forwarded without com-
ment to the court by the State Department. In comparing 
Deutsches the court claimed that in Deutsches the French cor-
poration was involved in a commercial venture "entirely divorced 
from any governmental function." 51 In this case the oil obtained by 
Anglo-Iranian provided Great Britain with fuel for its naval 
defense fleet. The court found this dispositive. It is curious, 
however, that the court in World Arrangements did not notice 
that the State Department's failure to comment upon a similar let-
ter in Deutsches was taken by that court as an indication that im-
munity was to be denied. The same failure to comment by the 
State Department was taken in World Arrangements to mean the 
opposite.52 The critical difference was that in Deutsches the State 
Department simply remained silent, but in this case the State 
Department actually delivered the diplomatic note in question to 
the court. The court also observed that the British government 
controlled the corporation by reason of its ownership of the 
ceeding administrations will resist the importunings of foreign governments and 
whether the courts will, or lawfully can, ignore express desires of the State 
Department premised on the authority of the executive branch's constitutional 
primacy in foreign affairs. 
Brower, Bistline & Loomis, supra note 38 (citations omitted). 
47. 338 U.S. 241, 250 n. 12 (1949). 
48. 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.C.D.C. 1952). 
49. Id. at 291. 
50. Id. at 289. 
51. Id. at 291. 
52. Id. at 290. 
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greater portion of the voting stock and considered it significant 
that the British government acquired its interest in the company 
"to insure a proper supply of petroleum, crude oil and other pro-
ducts for the British Fleet."53 
The Supreme Court addressed these issues in a somewhat dif-
ferent context in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Car-
bon Corp. 54 In that instance the Canadian government had made a 
private corporation its exclusive agent for the purchases of 
vanadium, a metal used in steel production. The Canadian corpora-
tjon, apparently not carrying out any particular directive, policy 
or activity of the Canadian government, conspired with an 
American affiliate to exclude American competitors from Cana-
dian markets. Noting there was no indication that the Canadian 
government or any of its officials "approved or would have ap-
proved"55 of the efforts to monopolize the market, the Court ruled 
the corporation's activities could not be considered governmental 
acts. The defendants argued their discriminatory purchasing 
policies were permitted by Canadian law. The Court dismissed 
this contention as not controlling, stating "there is nothing to in-
dicate that such law in any way compelled discriminatory purchas-
ing, and it is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal 
lose that character when they become constituent elements of an 
unlawful scheme."56 
The important distinction between an act merely permitted 
by foreign law and that required by foreign law or by specific 
decree of a foreign government was made clear in the Swiss 
Watch case.57 In that case the court stated: 
It is clear that these private agreements were then recognized 
as facts of economic and industrial life by [the Swiss] govern-
ment. Nonetheless that the Swiss may, as a practical matter, ap-
prove of the effects of this private activity cannot convert what 
is essentially a vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassail-
53. Id. 
54. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
55. Id. at 706. No court or commentator has suggested the Supreme Court meant to 
imply that if the Canadian government merely had "approved" of the monopolistic behavior 
in issue, then sovereign immunity would have attached to defendants' actions. Rather, the 
Court here seems to be saying that official approval would have been one of several indicia 
to be considered in determining whether to grant immunity. 
56. Id. at 707. 
57. United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] 
TRADE CASES (CCH) , 70,600 (1962), modified [1965] TRADE CASES (CCH) , 71,352. 
12
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1979], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol7/iss1/3
1979) Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
able system resulting from foreign governmental mandate. In 
the absence of direct foreign governmental action compelling the 
defendants' activities, a United States court may exercise its 
jurisdiction as to the acts and contracts abroad, if, as in the case 
at bar, such acts and contracts have a substantial and material 
effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce.58 
49 
More recently this distinction was discussed in Linseman v. 
The World Hockey Association.59 In that case a nineteen year old 
amateur hockey player brought suit challenging certain World 
Hockey Association (WHA) age regulations. The WHA refused to 
let Linseman play in Canada because he was underage and claimed 
it was "compelled" by the Canadian government's acceptance of 
the age regulation. In ruling that the WHA could not successfully 
assert that its exclusion of Linseman was the result of a Canadian 
governmental "act of state," the court observed that the Canadian 
government merely "endorsed" the age rule rather than compelled 
defendant to abide by the rule.60 
Although courts have used different formulae to explain their 
results, the underlying rationales seem to be grounded in the 
same general considerations. One commentator has suggested that 
foreign compulsion and related defenses really are a special case 
of the comity analysis already mentioned.61 Under this approach 
the difference between mere approval of, or suggestions from, the 
sovereign and outright compulsion is a difference in degree rather 
than in kind. That is, actual compulsion by the sovereign would in-
dicate its overriding interest in the matter and would place the 
situation closer to that end of the spectrum where U.S. courts 
would not interfere with the offending act. Mere suggestions or 
approval would tend to show that the matter was of lesser impor-
tance to the sovereign and its involvement would therefore be 
given less weight. Judge Choy in Timberlane 62 adopted a detailed 
set of factors that courts should consider in balancing the com-
peting of the foreign sovereign on one hand and U.S. economic in-
terests on the other. 
Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations 
58. [1963) TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 70,600 (1962) at 77,456-7 (citing Continental Ore Co.) 
(emphasis added). 
59. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.C. Conn. 1977). 
60. Id. at 1324. 
61. See ASIL Proceedings, supra note 24, at 117 (remarks of Douglas Rosenthal). 
62. 549 F .2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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Law of the United States63 outlines a series of considerations a 
court should take into account before it acts. Judge Choy refined 
the traditional balancing-of-interests analysis by listing a series of 
"variables" the court also should consider.64 Then, although 
without discussing the relationship of these factors, Judge Choy 
determined that a declaration of the foreign court did not con-
stitute a sovereign act of sufficient weight to cut off jurisdiction of 
antitrust matters. The Timberlane court did note that at least 
some of the defendants were foreign citizens and that most of the 
activity took place in Honduras, but it also observed that the con-
spiracy may have been directed from San Francisco and that the 
most direct economic effect was probably on Honduras. The court 
concluded, however, that there had been no indication of any con-
flict with the law or the policy of the Honduran government by 
allowing the suit to go forward and decided the U.S. interest 
outweighed whatever negligible interests of Honduras were in-
volved.65 
It appears that the commercial-political dichotomy contained 
in the FSIA is not particularly helpful because the economic 
policy-oriented activity of a state-owned company could be so 
politically important to the sovereign that no U.S. court would be 
willing to decide that the interests of private plaintiffs outweigh 
the interests of American foreign policy. For this reason, a U.S. 
plaintiff would have to allege both substantial harm and over-
riding U.S. interests to overcome the interest asserted by a 
63. RESTATEMENT§ 40 states that a court should act in the light of such factors as: (a) 
vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship 
that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which 
the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of 
the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably 
be expected to a;chieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. See Timberline, 
549 F.2d at 614 n. 31. 
64. Judge Choy, citing BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 
(1958), identifies these variables as: 
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United 
States as compared with conduct abroad; (b) the extent to which there is explicit 
purpose to harm or affect American consumers or Americans' business oppor-
tunities; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United States compared with 
those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or in the case of 
business associations, their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law 
to them; (e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies; and (fl the extent 
to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the interests of the 
United States or the foreign country. 
See also Timberlane, 549 F .2d at 541 n.31. 
65. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615. 
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foreign sovereign, whether compelled, suggested, or approved. 
The commercial-political distinction contained in the FSIA can 
therefore be characterized as an attempt to isolate one factor for 
courts in their balancing of interests. 
At least one alternative in analyzing this problem is to 
employ the commercial-political distinction in the FSIA's jurisdic-
tional context only. A court could treat acts containing elements 
of both as at least susceptible of jurisdiction; the political compo-
nent (compulsion, suggestion, approval) later could be raised as a 
substantive defense. The problem with this approach, however, 
lies in the FSIA itself. If an act is so purely "commercial" that a 
court is willing to grant jurisdiction under the FSIA, it may be in-
terpreted that the court already has determined at the outset the 
absence of the political component.66 In other words, if an act is 
purely commercial, then it would seem almost by definition not to 
have the political component. Yet at the moment a weighing of the 
degree of political involvement is undertaken, one departs from 
the plain language of the FSIA. 
Under what circumstances, or in which kinds of activities, 
have the courts found that the absence of political sensitivity is 
sufficient to allow jurisdiction and to overcome the sovereignty 
defenses on the merits? A review of cases brought under the 
FSIA reveals the limited inroads courts have made in this area. 
IV. FSIA DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Two questions must be answered in the context of an action 
under the FSIA. First, is the entity plaintiff seeks to sue a 
"foreign state" or an "agency or instrumentality" thereof?67 
Second, if the entity so qualifies, is the entity, be it a corporation, 
"corporate agency" or state agency, nonetheless engaged in activ-
ity of a commercial nature? 
Several cases demonstrate the interplay of these two con-
siderations. In Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Electrarna 
Krsko,68 plaintiff sought to prove that a Yugoslav "worker's 
organization" was a foreign state, apparently because no basis 
other than the FSIA could have provided the court with jurisdic-
66. From plaintiffs point of view, this appears to require it to make its entire case im-
mediately on the jurisdictional issue, even though various sovereignty defenses have been 
characterized as substantive. See generally Von Kalinowski, supra note 36. 
67. See FSIA §§ 1603(a) & (b), supra note 2. 
68. 441 F.$upp. 827, 831(S.D.N.Y.1977). 
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tion.69 The court did not find the entity an agency, instrumentality, 
or foreign state for purposes of in personam jurisdiction and 
dismissed the suit. One commentator surmises that, had the suit 
not been dismissed on the ground that no suable entity for FSIA 
purposes existed, then the Yugoslav organization, which was be-
ing sued for broker's fees on a sale of nuclear fuel, "almost certain-
ly would have been held not immune."70 That case can be com-
pared with Yessinin- Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 71 in which 
the court held the Soviet N ovosti press agency was a "foreign 
state" under the FSIA and emphasized its state ownership in 
granting immunity on a charge of defamation. The court found the 
FSIA particularly ill-suited to socialist entities but applied it 
nonetheless.72 In Carey v. National Oil Corp., 73 the Libyan National 
Oil Company was found to be a foreign state and held immune in 
the setting of an expropriation of plaintiff's property. Finally (and 
although the case is of limited significance because only entitle-
ment to removal from state to federal court was in issue rather 
than immunity), Herzberger v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 
S.A. 74 apparently held that a foreign corporation will be a foreign 
state if ultimate ownership of at least 50% of its control is in state 
hands regardless of the interposition of an intermediate corporate 
vehicle. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the FSIA has not, and indeed cannot, fulfill the 
hopes of its sponsors. Even when it has been "successfully" used, 
the FSIA has not been able to overcome any of the traditional 
substantive defenses used by foreign companies to insulate them-
selves from antitrust scrutiny. Foreign compulsion, sovereign im-
munity, and an act of state remain impregnable bastions to 
American plaintiffs injured by the effects of offshore conspiracies.75 
69. See Brower, Bristline & Loomis, supra note 38, at 202-03 & n. 21. 
70. Id. at 203. 
71. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
72. Id. at 852. 
73. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
74. 78 Civ. 2451 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1978). 
75. The problem has not gone entirely unnoticed by Congress. One recent legislative 
proposal would establish a Presidential Commission to study the international application of 
antitrust laws and the defenses of immunity, act of state and compulsion. See S. 1010, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Earlier proposals have contemplated abolishing the compulsion 
defense entirely. See, e.g., H.R. 8115, 8739 & 9925, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (bills died in 
committee). 
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